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1
In 2019, over 11,000 scientists declared the world to be in a “climate emergency.”1 If the
climate continues to change at its disastrous rate, then millions of humans will be affected by
environmental degradation for decades to come. In the last few decades, a climate refugee2 crisis
developed as a result of environmental factors such as “drought, desertification, deforestation,
soil erosion, water shortages, rising sea levels, and natural disasters.”3 Climate refugees are
people who have been displaced from their homes due to environmental changes and are forced
to seek refuge elsewhere, sometimes having to cross into other countries.4 Currently, there are 25
million climate refugees in the world, compared to the 22 million refugees of “traditional kind”–
or those fleeing homes for political reasons.5 Even with three million more climate refugees than
“traditional” refugees, international law does not recognize or protect these climate refugees. 6
Climate refugees are defined in three different ways: 1) environmental emergency
migrants, 2) environmental forced migrants, and 3) environmental motivated migrants.7 First,
environmental emergency migrants escape temporarily due to a sudden natural disaster such as a
flood, hurricane, or earthquake.8 Next, environmental forced migrants flee because of long-term
environmental threats such as coastal deterioration or deforestation.9 Finally, environmental
motivated migrants choose to leave their homes out of fear of future environmental issues; for
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2
example, someone who lives in Alexandria, Egypt may choose to leave now out of concern for
the dangers associated with rising sea levels in the near future.10 The distinction between the
types of climate refugees will be essential to the rest of this discussion.
Climate change is an existential crisis that threatens human existence. The United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) officially defined climate
change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that
alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is an addition to natural climate
variability observed over comparable time periods.”11 According to the New York Times,
scientists estimate that “rising seas could affect three times more people by 2050 than previously
thought.”12 From satellite readings and estimations of sea-level rise, it is now predicted that
many coastal cities will be underwater in thirty years, displacing over 150 million people.13
Significant areas of major global cities such as Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok, Shanghai, Mumbai,
Alexandria, and Basra will be underwater in the next few decades (see Appendix A).14 Scientists
acknowledge that there is an element of uncertainty in these projections. The pictorial
representations shown in Appendix A show the most recent projections on how countries like
Vietnam, Thailand, China, India, Egypt, and Iraq will be impacted by rising sea levels by 2050.15
This research begs the question: to what extent can states survive the changing climate? As the
numbers of climate refugees increase, some people will be forced to relocate to foreign territory.
Therefore, by analyzing how climate change might challenge some preconceived notions of what
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constitutes a state, I will be able to assert whether or not a state can maintain statehood in the
midst of a rapidly changing environment. To understand what makes someone a citizen of a
state, I will focus on the regions at greatest risk of climate-related disappearance and provide
further insight for this unique and complex phenomenon.
Understanding human rights is foundational to answer this research question. Centuries
ago, people were asking the same questions that are being asked today: “Are we obligated to
simply express words of sympathy or sorrow over the fate of victims of human rights abuse, or
do we have a responsibility to take concrete action to actually protect those who suffer?”16
Humans must determine how wide is their “circle of responsibility” and if it extends to the
people around them.17 The evolution of human rights began with the acknowledgment of human
duties, not from a specific assertion for human rights.18 At some point, we all must answer the
question: what is my duty as a human with regard to the people around me? What are the mutual
responsibilities in society? As the number of climate refugees increases worldwide, the answers
to these moral questions will dictate new environmental policies and possible limitations on the
concept of state sovereignty.

I.

The Global Response Toward Climate Refugees: Three Perspectives
The global impact of climate refugees is both alarming and dynamic. As a result of

displacement due to climate change, more and more people are forced to cross borders, creating
repercussions on international peace and security.19 Determining the most appropriate global
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response for climate change, specifically for climate refugees, is an extremely convoluted
process.20 When refugees are displaced, where are they supposed to relocate? Do states that are
largely accountable for accelerating climate change have a particular responsibility to welcome
climate refugees into their country? At the core of determining the global response toward
climate refugees is the relationship between climate change and human rights. The international
community answers the climate refugee crisis in three different ways—through
intergovernmental responsibility, legal reform, and private governance.21
Some argue that the solution to international security issues raised by climate refugees
lies in intergovernmental responsibility. The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 as an
intergovernmental organization in order to address the globe’s most pressing issues. The UN’s
2030 Global Agenda focuses on 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with “Climate
Action” as a cornerstone to development. At the 2019 Climate Action Summit, UN SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres declared, “The climate emergency is a race we are losing, but it is a
race we can win. The climate crisis is caused by us—and the solutions must come from us.”22 In
addition, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—the UN Refugee
Agency—assists nearly 60 million refugees in 126 countries.23 In 2008, the UNHCR dealt with
only 10 million refugees, which means its reach grew six times larger in the past decade.24 While
the UNHCR recognizes displaced persons as a result of climate change, its mandate focuses on
political refugees and does not currently extend to climate refugees.25 Other international
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agencies such as the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP), the World Bank, and the UN Security Council intercede to promote international
cooperation on global issues.26 By creating multilateral solutions through an intergovernmental
organization such as the UN, the international community can collaborate to better understand
the various climate crises occurring across the globe.
Others argue that legal reform is the most effective solution to those affected by climate
change displacement. Historically, the climate refugee crisis has been difficult for the
international community to address because “climate refugee” is not a legal term and is not
included in the description of a refugee in the 1951 Refugee Convention—a clear example of the
divide between human rights and climate change.27 By focusing on international legal reform,
climate refugees would be given protection and assistance under principles of “proximity,
proportionality, and non-discrimination.”28 In order to have the greatest impact, legal reforms
must remain broad in a climate change and human rights context.29 Initially, legal reforms should
focus on local importance, then expand to regional, and ultimately to global international law.30
By addressing climate refugees with legal reforms, the international community can experience
sustainable change.
In contrast to these perspectives, others counter that private governance can fill the gap
between law and needs of the international community.31 In response to the continued failure of
public institutions to instigate lasting solutions for climate change, a small group of “progressive
environmental scholars” have introduced private climate-governance initiatives to address
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climate refugees.32 The foundational purpose of private governance is to act as a placeholder
until strategic legal reform (as discussed in the second school of thought) is adopted.33 For
example, Tesla and IKEA have used creative design initiatives that encourage collaboration with
governments who are interested in environmentally friendly developments.34 Tesla works with
Puerto Rico and Australia in a public-private partnership to use the technology available to them
in order to temper the detrimental effects of climate change.35 Tesla has chosen to work with
governments because the public sector can fill gaps where the private sector is lacking. IKEA is
also using its resources to help displaced persons by ensuring that more shelters are properly
equipped with power and electricity.36 A major advantage of a private governance approach is
the relative autonomy the private sector has to create sustainable change, a freedom which
intergovernmental organizations or legal reforms sometimes lack.
The strengths and weaknesses of the three approaches in response to climate refugees is
clear. First, intergovernmental organizations often do not have the necessary framework to
guarantee long-lasting solutions for the entire world in a timely manner. The UN can most
adequately effect change through its smaller specialized agencies, such as the UNHCR, if its
mandate can expand to officially recognize climate refugees. Although international law has the
potential to create binding solutions among states, many aspects of this model are problematic
including the difficulty of enforcing international law. “Political will,” or various political
motivations and policies, stands in the way of constituting any international agreements.37
Because the climate refugee dilemma has only developed in recent years, “climate refugee” is
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not a recognized legal term and there is no legal precedent on the issue.38 As a result, human
rights and climate change developed into two distinct legal systems. This forces policy makers to
invent a way to merge the two.39 Finally, private governance can create change through small
actions, but private governance does not have nearly the breadth of political or ethical influence
that governmental organizations have. According to Jane Steffens of Vanderbilt Law, “Private
climate-governance initiatives can bypass government gridlock in a way that international law
cannot because corporate contracts are not required to respect international boundaries.”40 As a
result, private governance can be just the vehicle needed to effect substantial global change.41 In
2002, former secretary-general of the UN Kofi Annan applauded the private sector for being
“critical in the protection of the environment.”42 Even with the power of intergovernmental
organizations like the UN, there are gaps in progress that the private sector has filled.
While there are three perspectives on the best global response toward climate refugees,
the most effective technique is one that utilizes intergovernmental organizations like the UN and
other coalitions that partner with the UN to advocate for smaller states. With agencies like the
UNHCR, intergovernmental organizations have the opportunity to combine the advantages of the
other two schools of thought—legal reform and private governance. In the 1950s, at the time of
the Geneva Convention and creation of the UNHCR’s mandate, the global community could not
have imagined the vast emergence of climate refugees, therefore it is time that we respond. 43
While intergovernmental organizations provide the best solutions to climate refugees by bridging
the gap between the public and private sector with far-reaching international influence,
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ultimately each of the three approaches must work together in order to be most effective.
Intergovernmental organizations merge both states and the private sector in order to form
international law.

II.

International Law
International law defines the state as an entity with a “permanent population, territory,

government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states.”44 This is an important starting
point to understand how people are protected under international law. Many wish to develop an
international framework regarding climate refugees since climate refugees pose several threats to
international security.45 Edith Brown Weiss, a law professor at Georgetown University Law
Center, says that “in order to implement a strategy for managing global climate change, it will be
necessary to develop enforceable norms of behavior at the international, national, and local
level.”46 Existing legal structures such as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),
the 1951 Refugee Convention, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
including the Kyoto Protocol, the UNHCR’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and
the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) guide the international community to create more
binding solutions.47
The concept of refugee was officially defined in the 1951 Refugee Convention as
“someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war, or
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violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”48 The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), created by the UN in 1948, delineated the international
understanding of human rights.49 From the UDHR framework, the world was able to understand
the role of human rights in the world such as individual rights and collective responsibilities,
sparking a significant transformation in international, regional, and national actions in support of
human rights.50 Over seventy years after its creation, the UDHR is still regarded as the “greatest
achievement of the UN” and “one of the greatest steps forward in the process of global
civilization.”51
In 1992, the Kyoto Protocol resulted in better facilitation of “regional law and policy
development in response to climate change displacement,” which directly affects climate refugee
protection today.52 While the Kyoto Protocol is one among few “international attempts to curb
climate change,” specialized frameworks are needed to solidify change and protection for
refugees. For example, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)—an intergovernmental
organization—advocates to the UN on behalf of Small Island Developing States (SIDS).53 The
UNHCR’s Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement exists to encourage national policies to
protect internally displaced persons.54 In 2018, the UN General Assembly ratified the Global
Compact on Refugees (GCR) to bolster the way the international system reacts to “large-scale
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and protracted displacement worldwide.”55 Because of the GCR, the UNHCR acknowledges that
“climate, environmental degradation, and natural disasters increasingly interact with the drivers
of refugee movements.”56 Without these frameworks, makers of international law would lack
understanding of various states’ interests regarding climate refugees.
While intergovernmental organizations like the UN have initiated global conversations
regarding the effects of climate change, significant gaps in international law between human
rights and environmental rights prevent lawmakers from legally protecting climate refugees.57
This is due to a myriad reason such as considering how a binding law will affect those who are
displaced. A common fear among lawmakers is that “applying a human rights framework to
climate refugees could eventually lead to a harm that outweighs the purported benefits.”58
However, other scholars disagree, asserting that since “climate change will result in the
infringement of human rights, it makes normative sense to consider climate change via a human
rights framework.”59 Additionally, climate change must take into consideration scientific
knowledge, which frequently changes; therefore, drafted legal solutions must be able to adapt to
scientific discoveries.60 When applying law to the international sphere, lawmakers must consider
the issues of crossing borders, shared responsibility, and defining the problem.
Climate refugees who seek refuge by crossing borders into other states encounter unique
difficulties. If climate refugees can no longer stay in the country they were displaced from,
which country is responsible for relocating them? Steffens contends that “even if responsibility

55

Madeline Garlick and Volker Türk, “Addressing Displacement in the Context of Disasters and the Adverse
Effects of Climate Change: Elements and Opportunities in the Global Compact on Refugees,” International Journal
of Refugee Law 31, no. 2 (2019): 389.
56
Ibid.
57
Steffens, 755.
58
Ibid., 756.
59
Ibid., 755.
60
Weiss, 625.

11
and harm could be established, existing human rights law is concerned primarily with how a
government treats its own citizens and others living within its territory and under its
jurisdiction.”61 While some climate refugees must cross borders during relocation, the majority
seek protection in their “country of origin” and become known as internally displaced persons or
IDPs.62 The 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement acts as a “soft law” to address the
protection of IDPs.63 Paragraph 2 of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement defines IDPs
by including the concept of environmentally displaced persons:
[IDPs are defined as] persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to
flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or
in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not
crossed an internationally recognized State border.64
Angela Williams, law professor at the University of Sussex, reminds the international
community that “as the Refugee Convention is limited to situations where forced migration
results in persons crossing state borders, the plight of those displaced internally falls outside the
remit of the Refugee Convention, and, thus, such individuals are not protected by the framework
of international refugee law."65 Because the majority of climate refugees are IDPs, the
responsibility of protection often falls on the state and its willingness to guarantee rights to the
IDPs.66
The GCR discusses the importance of responsibility sharing regarding IDPs in the
international community. Paragraph 12 of the GCR affirms that “states may seek support from
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the international community to address complex challenges, which may include those arising in
the context of disasters and the adverse effects of climate change.”67 In order to best support
climate refugees, the GCR encourages states to support communities who are hosting refugee
populations.68 The GCR enhances answers to displacement, including in developing countries,
through “resettlement and complementary pathways comprising, inter alia, labour migration,
student visa schemes, family reunification, and humanitarian visas. It also seeks to foster
improved conditions for sustainable return, as well as local solutions including, where
appropriate, integration, in host countries.”69 Furthermore, the GCR mobilizes a “wide range of
stakeholders, including governments, international organizations, civil society, and the private
sector, to transform the way these respond to displacement and international protection
challenges” and complements the legal refugee protection system by encouraging collaboration
between states of origin and states of relocation for increased unity with climate refugees.70
Some of the greatest challenges lawmakers face include how to legally define climate
refugees, how to protect them, and who is responsible for doing so. Steffens says that
“establishing a proper name for those displaced by climate change is important because whatever
name is adopted will have real implications for the obligations of the international community
under the law.”71 However, at present, no term defining climate refugees is legally binding under
international law.72 Madeline Garlick and Volker Türk, both senior-level officials for the
UNHCR, say that “refugees must be correctly recognized as such in accordance with
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international legal criteria, rather than receiving a complementary form of status.”73 In the 1970s,
the concept of environmentally displaced persons first emerged after significant desertification in
Africa.74 Then, the phenomenon was defined as “those who have been forced to leave their
traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption
that jeopardizes their existence and/or seriously affected the quality of life.”75 The UNHCR uses
the term “environmentally displaced persons” and rejects the term “environmental refugee” as a
“misnomer” because using the term “refugee” confuses the responsibility between the national
government of the displaced person and the international community at large.76 Others
intentionally use the word “migrant” instead of “refugee” to avoid stark political implications
and to lead to more effective protections by “de-victimizing migrants and reframing their
decision to migrate as an adaptation tool.”77 Constantly changing the definition implies that the
climate refugee epidemic is a political issue instead of an environmental one; therefore, the goal
of a unanimous definition is to gain international consensus that this group needs both
“recognition and protection.”78
Since climate refugees are not legally recognized as “refugees,” many have suggested
amending the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. However, changing the definition in the
Convention risks weakening the current protection for refugees and “could endanger the
advances achieved so far in the early years of the 21st century.”79 Additionally, several
governments strongly object to this because it would “open the refugee floodgates,” resulting in
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severe security consequences.80 Expanding this definition is not the best solution because
“adding the adjective ‘environmental’ to the category ‘refugee’ is generally unhelpful given that
environmental change cannot meaningfully be separated from political and economic changes.”81
In 2002, the UNHCR made a statement warning against this saying, “Lumping both groups
together under the same heading would further cloud the issues and could undermine efforts to
help and protect either group to address the root causes of either type of displacement.”82
Repeatedly, the UNHCR explains that the significant differences between traditional refugees
and climate migrants entails a separate legal treatment of the two groups.83 For example, those
displaced by environmental change could still rely on their national government while traditional
refugees cannot.84 Another hindrance to specifically defining this term is that doing so will lead
to “in” and “out” groups.85 Rather than a specific definition of climate refugee, the GCR
advocates a broader interpretation of “refugee” in order to overcome the existing gaps in
international law regarding climate change.86 Vikram Kolmannskog, a member of the Norwegian
Refugee Council, asserts that policy makers “should fully exploit existing international law by
applying a dynamic and context-oriented interpretation of internally displaced person law,
refugee law and human rights law as well as develop new law and policy on national, regional,
and international levels.”87 While defining “refugee” has been problematic, some believe that an
expansive view of what is already in place can pave the way for significant protections.
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International law easily becomes convoluted when sovereignty conflicts with individual
interests. A UN official comments on the delicacy of international law, sovereignty, and
individual rights:
The setting up of international machinery to protect individual human rights would be
one of the greatest international achievements in history. It would assert that just as the
real purpose of a state’s government is to ensure the welfare of the individual human
being, so the real concern of international law is with the welfare of individuals. It would
at the same time be a more drastic limitation of sovereignty than any state has yet been
prepared to accept.88
At this time, it is not necessary to change the existing international law on climate
refugees, but rather the focus should be on expanding its interpretation in “dynamic and
contextual” ways.89 For example, the 1951 Refugee Convention is nearly seventy years old but
has remained relevant except for its omission of climate refugees.90 A new treaty offering a “fix
all” solution would not be the best answer either.91 The best solution is not necessarily in
creating new legislation, but through building on the existing framework. Additionally,
cooperation between the UN and other organizations such as UNHCR, IOM, and AOSIS is the
essential link for successful “policy development.”92 By first implementing a bottom-up
approach in regional strategies then expanding to global protection, climate refugees can be
protected and recognized in international law.93

III.
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The developing world is most impacted by climate change and sea-level rise. Small
Developing Island States (SIDS) are facing the greatest risk of territory disappearance due to
rising sea levels, despite the fact that SIDS only account for “0.03 percent of total worldwide
CO2 emissions.”94 Teburoro Tito, the former President of the Republic of Kiribati, a SIDS, uses a
metaphor to describe the susceptibility of small island states to climate change and large
hegemonies in the international system: “It is like little ants making a home on a leaf floating on
a pond. And the elephants go to drink and roughhouse in the water. The problem is not the ants’
behavior. It’s a problem of how to convince the elephants to be more gentle.”95According to
Pamela Chasek, Chair of the Political Science Department at Manhattan College, “Pacific SIDS
believe that while the Kyoto Protocol was a first step towards cutting back on greenhouse gas
emission, the targets contained in the Kyoto Protocol were inadequate.”96 Valentina Baiamonte
and Chiara Redaelli, Ph.D. graduates from the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, explain the tensions between SIDS and industrialized countries in this
hypothetical scenario:
In the case of sea-level rise, for instance, a state A can be the main producer of
greenhouse gases while at the same time less affected by global warming and sea-level
rise. State A may also have more financial resources to tackle the problem and deploy
climate change adaptation measures; thus, it does not urgently need international support.
Conversely, a state B can be highly impacted by sea-level rise, but have few resources to
tackle the issue. Thus, state B would be more prone to advocate for stricter international
emission regulations and cooperative solutions to tackle issues posed by climate change,
both internationally and bilaterally.97
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Table 1 illustrates the disproportionate effects of climate change and the relationship
between developing and industrialized states.98 The top column differentiates between countries
with high or low sea-level rise vulnerability. The horizontal column specifies which countries
have high or low abatement costs. If a country has a high abatement cost, then a high financial
commitment is necessary to fulfil the environmental requirements.

Sea level vulnerability
Low
Abatement
Costs

High

Low

(a) Bystanders

(b) Intermediaries

High

(c) Draggers

(d) Promoters

Table 1: Adaptation from Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta to show the difference in concern
between developing and industrialized states regarding climate change.99

States in cell (d), promoters, would presumably advocate for specific and strict
environmental regulations for the world since their population would be at a high risk of being
displaced. This category would most likely comprise SIDS who have both high vulnerability to
sea-level rise and high abatement costs. These abatement costs would include guaranteeing safe
drinking water and preventing destruction of fertile soil. The population of promoters is at the
highest risk of becoming climate refugees.100
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Countries in cell (b) “act as intermediates as they have lower abatement costs and higher
levels of vulnerability to sea-level rise.”101 These countries share their high vulnerability to
climate change with SIDS; therefore, they understand the seriousness of these issues.102
States in cell (a), bystanders, have both “little concern about sea-level rise, and low
abatement costs.”103 For example, land-locked countries, such as Switzerland, are considered
bystanders and their populations are at very low risk of being displaced by sea-level rise.
Because of this, they do not necessarily have a national interest in increasing climate regulations.
However, the bystanders’ low abatement costs could encourage them to advocate for the SIDS
that are at high risk of destruction.104
Finally, the countries in cell (c), draggers, “display low levels of vulnerability, yet high
costs, dragging the scope of environmental commitment behind. ‘Draggers’ may be skeptical
about joining costly international commitments focusing on sea-level rise.” Often industrialized
countries are considered draggers and their population is at very low risk of climate-related
displacement105
There are fifty-seven SIDS spanning the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, Caribbean,
Mediterranean, and South China Sea.106 Environmental scientists have repeatedly found that
“most SIDS are situated only one meter above sea level and face gradual sea-level rise along
with extreme weather events like flooding.”107 With likely submergence in the next thirty years,
SIDS present unprecedented difficulties for international refugee law.108 Ilan Kelman, researcher

101

Ibid.
Ibid.
103
Ibid., 17.
104
Ibid., 17, 18.
105
Ibid.
106
Steffens, 738.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
102

19
at University College London, says the three main ways that SIDS could become uninhabitable
are through sea-level rise, ocean acidification, and contaminated food systems.109
Table 2 shows how various SIDS are likely to be impacted by climate change.
SIDS location

Results

33 reef islands of the Solomon Islands Island responses range from entire disappearance to
minor accretion.
Torres Islands, Vanuatu

Reef islands of Tarawa Atoll, Kiribati

Eight islands of the Marshall Islands

Tectonic subsidence is dominating sea-level rise as
the reason for ocean encroachment.
Sea-level rise is measurable, but atoll changes are
mainly from local societal activities. Where societal
activities are less noticeable, some shorelines are
eroding and some are accreting.
Sea-level rise is measurable, but all the islands show
net accretion.

29 islands of Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu

Sea-level rise is measurable, with island responses
ranging from severe erosion to significant land gain.

Takú Atoll, Papua New Guinea

Sea-level rise is measurable, but is not dominating
natural shoreline dynamics.

Over 200 Pacific islands

Despite measurable sea-level rise, little evidence
exists of island sizes being reduced, with both local
societal activities and wider environmental cycles
dominating sea-level rise.

17 atolls across Kiribati

Increased rates of change for both erosion and
accretion.

27 atoll islands across the Federated
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, and
Tuvalu

Sea-level rise is measurable, but the islands showed a
mixture of erosion, accretion, and stability, with only
a few islands losing area overall.

47 atolls of Manihi and Manuae,
French Polynesia

Despite measurable sea-level rise, most island areas
are expanding or remaining stable, although major
localized changes are seen. Two atolls showed local
societal activities influencing the changes.
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Table 2: Current research of how climate change has affected these various SIDS.110

Many inhabitants of SIDS note how the possibility of migration has become part of their
culture, observing that “only a handful of SIDS have current communities which are older than a
few millennia.”111 One example of the effects of climate change on migration is the Maldives—
“an Indian Ocean archipelago with 1,190 islands grouped into 26 low-lying coral atolls, where its
highest point is only 2.4 meters above sea level.”112 While Maldivians are aware of the imminent
threat of their island sinking, many are more concerned with current non-climate related
difficulties such as freshwater shortage and housing management.113 Like the Maldives, many
SIDS are experiencing other economic, environmental, and societal hardships so that likely the
climate refugee threat is not their most immediate concern. Robert Stojanov, a renowned
environmental professor at Mendel University in Brno, claims that the climate refugee scare is
misdirecting the attention of policymakers:
Many assume that climate change will dominate migration decisions and lead to
inevitable, forced movement, but neither the people affected nor the science support this
belief. A policy approach that accounts for people’s migration-related interests,
preferences, resources, and decision-making criteria instead would ensure that people
have a say in and control over their own migration-related fates. With governmental and
non-governmental support for migration-related decisions, including working through
options with the people being affected, rather than prescribing top-down decisions,
migrants can mitigate the detrimental consequences of migration, such as mental health
impacts from loss of home and identity.114
According to current projections, sea-level rise will have significant effects on Maldivian
migration choices, but so will many other factors. Maldivians are also preparing for migration
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due to “livelihood-related, social and environmental reasons.”115 Furthermore, “Maldivians’
primary migration-related interests remain jobs, health, and education,” not environmental
threats.116 Many young people in the Maldives migrate to other countries for better job
opportunities, economic structures, and financial resources.117 Even when climate change forces
more Maldivians to seek refuge elsewhere, these other factors are still expected to influence
migration choices.
To address this, AOSIS exists to advocate to the UN on behalf of the SIDS since many of
them are not UN members. In the thirty years of its existence, AOSIS has been able to maximize
the influence of SIDS in the UN by generating awareness for the unique issues that these island
states face.118 Mary Jo Larson, Director at the Center for Development and Population Activities,
says that “through multilateral environmental negotiations, which are more inclusive and
transparent than bilateral negotiations, low-power parties can become influential participants in
policy debates.”119 SIDS are able to have a voice in international negotiations because of the
influence of AOSIS. While major cities in countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, China, India,
Egypt, and Iraq are also at high risk of submersion, SIDS’ unique case of their immediate
vulnerability makes them compelling subjects for scientists and policymakers to study.120

IV.

Conclusion: Rethinking Statehood
International law does not adequately protect the human rights of climate refugees.

Because millions of people will be displaced by climate change, it is essential that climate
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refugees be protected in international law. State sovereignty is at the heart of this dilemma and
must be reimagined as the world adapts to the rapidly changing climate. Today, we face a new
reality: state territory will disappear and people will be forced to relocate. In response to this, the
international system should rethink both sovereignty and the state itself as promoters of human
flourishing.
States are wary of adopting new frameworks on climate refugees or welcoming them into
their borders because of state sovereignty.121 When individual rights are a global responsibility,
states’ desire to maintain their sovereignty often hinders successful agreements. Williams asserts
that since environmental legislation involves economic, social, and political policies, universal
agreements would “cut to the very heart of state sovereignty.”122 The issue now becomes, is the
preservation of state sovereignty important enough to forego human rights assistance? Selma
Oliver, professor at Lund University in Sweden, argues that it has “become apparent that the
principle of state sovereignty, although recently increasingly impinged by concern for human
rights, still hinders the continued protection of the human rights of the individuals in
question.”123
While creating environmental policy has the potential for lasting improvements and
protections, factors such as sovereignty, limits of the law, and its effect on those who are forced
to migrate indicate that law and policy may not be the most effective solution to the changing
climate. For example, SIDS like Tuvalu worry that industrialized countries believe relocation to
be the catch-all solution to the issue of climate refugees instead of restricting the greenhouse gas
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emissions responsible for much of the sea-level rise.124 Additionally, many scholars believe that
expanding the 1951 Refugee Convention to include climate refugees will be counterproductive
and result in weaker protection for both political and climate refugees. Furthermore, islanders
who are displaced by climate change “have expressed discomfort in being considered
‘refugees.’”125 Barbora Duží, a Research Fellow at the Czech Academy of Sciences in Brno,
asserts,
Policymakers should not assume that islanders must migrate to adapt to climate change.
Even though major climate change impacts, especially sea-level rise, may or may not
change future perceptions of migration, climate change must always be placed within the
wider context of many other social and environmental impacts and opportunities for
islanders. Otherwise, a danger exists of implementing a policy solution without
understanding the policy problem, harming the people affected.126
The reluctance of states to give up their sovereignty is a primary barrier to implementing
international agreements. State sovereignty itself is the hindrance to meaningful changes in the
international sphere, not gaps in international law. Therefore, I assert that the state can persist
without its territory even when a substantial portion of its population must be resettled due to
climate change.
Nonetheless, since state sovereignty is not going away, SIDS are already preparing for
the loss of their territory. Recently, Kiribati “bought 5,460 acres of land from Fiji, and the
President of the Republic of Fiji, Ratu Epeli Nailatikau, affirmed ‘that the people of Kiribati will
have a home if their country is submerged by the rising sea level as a result of climate
change.’”127 This poses yet another exceptional question about statehood and sovereignty. When
Kiribati relocates to Fiji, will its citizens maintain Kiribatian nationality or will they be
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considered Fijian? Baiamonte and Redaelli say that the relocated persons will steadily obtain
“double-nationality” and will be diplomatically protected by the host state.128 Furthermore,
“Maldives is negotiating with India the acquisition of land in order to relocate the population
therein, while India is pushing to have access to Maldives’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in
exchange.”129 In this case, climate refugees have a direct effect on international trade as India
and Maldives negotiate a deal to satisfy each state’s interests. Are states interested in assisting
with relocation of environmentally displaced persons only as long as it benefits them?
Kolmannskog comments on this by saying, “A ‘hegemonic’ understanding of state sovereignty
allows for state abuses and lack of protection of IDPs in general. Alternative understandings of
sovereignty as the responsibility to protect and ensure rights for all citizens are important in IDP
advocacy and can be seen as part of subaltern cosmopolitanism.”130 As climate refugees increase,
it is likely that surrounding states will cling onto their state sovereignty even tighter. With this
expectation, the Maldives and Kiribati are acting proactively for the protection of their citizens.
For maximum protection of climate refugees, IDPs, and SIDS territory, sovereignty cannot be
overlooked but must be incorporated into all policy decisions regarding environmental
degradation and its effect on migration.
When islands are submerged or an entire state is lost due to environmental degradation,
what happens to its citizens? Do they become stateless? According to Article 1 of the 1954
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, a stateless person is defined as “a person
who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law.”131 This definition
presupposes that a person becomes stateless when a state denies that person’s nationality;
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therefore, citizens from submerged states do not technically become stateless.132 However, the
increase of stateless persons is a true concern as sea levels are projected to rise rapidly in the next
thirty years. Oliver says “the risk is that these individuals fall from being nationals of stable
sovereign states to becoming stateless aliens in foreign states.”133 How do islands, or other
countries, continue as sovereign states when their territory is gone due to climate change? Again,
“international law favors stability and the continued recognition of states regardless of crises.”134
Without territory, SIDS could still participate and advocate in UN discussions, or be advocated
for via AOSIS.135 Even with these rights still guaranteed to “stateless persons,” the UNHCR
supports the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness to mitigate statelessness and
care for stateless persons.136
So, what does it mean to be a state without the defined territory of a country? Take
Singapore for example—the world’s only sovereign city-state—which is home to nearly six
million people and has one of the leading economies in the world.137 While Singapore has
territory, its case is significant because although Singapore is not a country, it has the
sovereignty of one. According to the CIA World Factbook, Singapore has the seventh highest
GDP per capita in the world, overtaking many developed countries which is significant for
Singapore’s size and sovereignty.138 Additionally, Singapore has one of the lowest global
unemployment rates at 2.2% with over $500 billion of purchasing power.139 The case of
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Singapore shows how borders and sovereignty have been re-imagined in light of the decreasing
importance of territory. Therefore, it is clear that states can survive the changing climate because
territory and borders are no longer an essential element of statehood. In fact, states have the
potential to be more prosperous without land. Giok Ling Ooi, professor at the National Institute
of Education in Singapore, says:
With the state and nation becoming less and less the territorial, political and symbolic
privileged framework for economic, social and cultural life, development has implied
cultural fragmentation and, with this, the questions about the meanings of cultural and
national identities as well as relations between minorities and majority groups in multiethnic nation-states and national societies.140
The example of Singapore proves the possibility for states to have significance in the
international community without having specific borders of a country. Another example of this is
the “Virtual State”—an idea first introduced by Richard Rosecrance in 1996 as a “state that has
downsized its territorially based production capability.”141 Currently, the “only international
civilization worthy of the name is the governing economic culture of the world market” which
can function independently of territory and citizens, proving that the state can exist even when its
people are relocated.142 Rosecrance discusses Singapore’s success in the global economy despite
unique circumstances and a relatively small amount of territory:
As the success of Singapore has demonstrated, however, huge open spaces are scarcely
necessary for economic competence, nor are pre-existing competitive products.
Singapore does not produce a single commodity in which it had a prior comparative
advantage. It does not have oil, tin, or rice—the typical products of its neighbors. Its
economic position rests on "created" comparative advantages in semiconductors, textiles,
and important service industries. The countries now entering the international system are
much smaller than their imperial forebears, yet they can achieve stunning economic
capacity.143
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If Rosecrance’s assertion of a “Virtual State” is true that territory has become less
important in the global economy, the SIDS whose territory is at risk can still survive as states in
the international system after their land has disappeared.
As SIDS shift their focus to relocation amidst sea-level rise and protection of IDPs,
maintaining sovereignty can be achieved if economies remain strong. Since creating policy
relating to climate refugees involves the surrender of social, political, and economic sovereignty,
a state can persist in the preservation of its economic system and market. Human rights and state
sovereignty are meant to be compatible; however, the state itself is not the answer. The ultimate
goal is that human rights are universally upheld. Keeping in mind the origins of human rights,
states can protect their future population by continuing to assert power in the international
system during a climate crisis. By doing this, states can remain sovereign even without territory.
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Appendix A
Projected Sea-Level Rise in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam by 2050

Courtesy of New York Times144

Projected Sea-Level Rise in Bangkok, Thailand by 2050

Courtesy of New York Times145
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Projected Sea-Level Rise in Shanghai, China by 2050
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Projected Sea-Level Rise in Mumbai, India by 2050
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Projected Sea-Level Rise in Alexandria, Egypt by 2050
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Projected Sea-Level Rise in Basra, Iraq by 2050
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